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Thedesire to knowwhat the future holds is a powerful
motivator in everyday life, but it is unknown how this
desire is created by neurons in the brain. Here we
show that when macaque monkeys are offered a
water reward of variable magnitude, they seek ad-
vance information about its size. Furthermore, the
same midbrain dopamine neurons that signal the ex-
pected amount of water also signal the expectation
of information, in a manner that is correlated with
the strength of the animal’s preference. Our data
show that single dopamine neurons process both
primitive and cognitive rewards, and suggest that
current theories of reward-seeking must be revised
to include information-seeking.
INTRODUCTION
Dopamine-releasing neurons located in the substantia nigra pars
compacta and ventral tegmental area are thought to play
a crucial role in reward learning (Wise, 2004). Their activity bears
a remarkable resemblance to ‘‘prediction errors’’ signaling
changes in a situation’s expected value (Schultz et al., 1997;
Montague et al., 2004). When a reward or reward-predictive
cue is more valuable than expected, dopamine neurons fire
a burst of spikes; if it has the same value as expected, they
have little or no response; and if it is less valuable than expected,
they are briefly inhibited. Based on these findings, many theories
invoke dopamine neuron activity to explain human learning and
decision-making (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Montague et al.,
2004) and symptoms of neurological disorders (Redish, 2004;
Frank et al., 2004), inspired by the idea that these neurons could
encode the full range of rewarding experiences, from the primi-
tive to the sublime. However, their activity has almost exclusively
been studied for basic forms of reward such as food and water. It
is unknown whether the same neurons that process these basic,
primitive rewards are involved in processing more abstract,
cognitive rewards (Schultz, 2000).
We therefore chose to study a form of cognitive reward that is
shared between humans and animals. When people anticipate
the possibility of a large future gain—such as an exciting new
job, a generous raise, or having their research published in
a prestigious scientific journal—they do not like to be held insuspense about their future fate. They want to find out now. In
other words, even when people cannot take any action to influ-
ence the final outcome, they often prefer to receive advance
information about upcoming rewards. Here we define ‘‘advance
information about upcoming rewards’’ as a cue that is available
before reward delivery and is statistically dependent on the
reward outcome. We do not mean information in the quantitative
sense of mathematical information theory (Supplemental Note A
available online). Related concepts have been arrived at inde-
pendently in several fields of study. Economists have studied
‘‘temporal resolution of uncertainty’’ (Kreps and Porteus, 1978),
and have shown that humans often prefer their uncertainty to
be resolved earlier rather than later (Chew and Ho, 1994; Ahl-
brecht and Weber, 1996; Eliaz and Schotter, 2007; Luhmann
et al., 2008). Experimental psychologists have studied ‘‘ob-
serving behavior’’ (Wyckoff, 1952), and have shown that a class
of observing behavior that produces reward-predictive cues can
be a powerful motivator for rats, pigeons, and humans (Wyckoff,
1952; Prokasy, 1956; Daly, 1992; Lieberman et al., 1997). To
date, however, there has not been a rigorous test of this prefer-
ence in nonhuman primates, the animals in which the reward-
predicting activity of dopamine neurons has been best
described (Schultz, 2000; Schultz et al., 1997; Montague et al.,
2004) (Supplemental Note B).
To this end, we developed a simple decision task allowing rhe-
sus macaque monkeys to choose whether to receive advance
information about the size of an upcoming water reward. We
found that monkeys expressed a strong behavioral preference,
preferring information to its absence and preferring to receive
the information as soon as possible. Furthermore, midbrain
dopamine neurons that signaled the monkey’s expectation of
water rewards also signaled the expectation of advance informa-
tion, in a manner that was correlated with the animal’s prefer-
ence. These results show that the dopaminergic reward system
processes both primitive and cognitive rewards, and suggest
that current theories of reward-seeking must be revised to
include information-seeking.
RESULTS
Behavioral Preference for Advance Information
We trained two monkeys to perform a simple decision task (‘‘infor-
mation choice task,’’ Figure 1A). On each trial two colored targets
appeared on the left and right sides of a screen, and the monkey
had to choose between them by making a saccadic eyeNeuron 63, 119–126, July 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 119
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received either a big or a small water reward. The monkey’s choice
had no effect on the reward size—both reward sizes were always
equally probable. However, choosing one of the colored targets
produced an informative cue—a cue whose shape indicated the
size of the upcoming reward. Choosing the other color produced
a random cue—a cue whose shape was randomizedand therefore
had no meaning. The positions of the targets were randomized on
each trial. To familiarize monkeys with the two options, we inter-
leaved choice trials with forced-information trials and forced-
random trials, in which only one of the targets was available.
After only a few days of training, both monkeys expressed
a strong preference to view informative cues (Figure 1B). Monkey
Z chose information about 80% of the time, and monkey V’s
choice rate was even higher, close to 100%. Their preference
for advance information cannot be explained by a difference in
the amount of water reward, because information did not allow
monkeys to obtain extra water from the reward-delivery appa-
ratus (Figure S1), and had little effect on whether they completed
a trial successfully (<2% error rate for each target, Figure S2).
An important concern is that advance information might
have allowed monkeys to extract a greater amount of subjective
value from the water reward by physically preparing for its
delivery—for instance, by tensing their cheek muscles to swish
water around in their mouths in a more pleasurable fashion (Per-
kins, 1955). We therefore introduced a second task that equal-
ized the opportunity for simple physical preparation (Mitchell
et al., 1965) (‘‘information delay task,’’ Figure 2A). Monkeys again
chose between informative and random cues, but afterward
a second cue appeared that was always informative on every
trial. Thus, information was always available well in advance of
reward delivery; the choice was between receiving the informa-
tion immediately, or after a delay.
Soon after being exposed to the new task, both monkeys ex-
pressed a clear preference for immediate information, compa-
rable to their preference in original task (Figure 2B). We then
reversed the relationship between cue colors and information
content, and monkeys switched their choices to the newly infor-
mative color (Figure 2B, Figure S3). We conclude that monkeys
treated information about rewards as if it was a reward in itself,
preferring information to its absence and preferring to receive it
as soon as possible.
Dopamine Neurons Signal Advance Information
To understand the neural basis of the rewarding value of informa-
tion, we recorded the activity of 47 presumed midbrain dopa-
mine neurons while monkeys performed the information choice
task shown in Figure 1. As in previous studies, we focused on
neurons that were presumed to be dopaminergic based on
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Figure 1. Behavioral Preference for Advance Information
(A) Information choice task. Fractions represent probabilities of different trial
types.
(B) Percent choice of information for each monkey. Each dot represents
a single day of training. The mean number of choice trials per session was
152 for monkey V (range: 71–203) and 161 for monkey Z (range: 39–285).
The gray region is the Clopper-Pearson 95% confidence interval for each day.
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Figure 2. Behavioral Preference for Immediate Delivery of Infor-
mation
(A) Information delay task. The fixation point and target configurations (not
shown here) were the same as in the information choice task shown in
Figure 1A.
(B) Percent choice of immediate information. Conventions as in Figure 1B. The
vertical line labeled ‘‘reversal’’ marks the time when the informative and
random cue colors were switched. The mean number of choice trials per
session was 151 for monkey V (range: 50–222) and 111 for monkey Z (range:
35–176). The behavioral preference started below 50% because the cue colors
were reused from a pilot experiment; the informative color had been previously
trained as random, and vice versa (Figure S3).120 Neuron 63, 119–126, July 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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(Top) Firing rate of an example neuron. Trials are sorted sepa-
rately for each task event, as follows. Target: forced-informa-
tion (red), choice-information (pink), forced-random (blue).
Cue: informative cues (red) indicating that the reward is big
(solid) or small (dashed); random cues (blue) with the same
shape as informative cues for big (solid, cross shape) or small
(dashed, wave shape) rewards. Reward: informative (red) trials,
the same trials as for the cue response; random (blue) trials,
where the reward was big (solid) or small (dashed). The firing
rate was smoothed with a Gaussian kernel, s = 20 ms. (Bottom)
Rasters for individual trials. Each row is a trial, and each dot is
a spike. Colors are the same as in the firing rate display, except
that dark colors correspond to dashed lines.standard electrophysiological criteria and that signaled the value
of water rewards (henceforth referred to as dopamine neurons)
(Experimental Procedures). Figure 3 shows an example neuron
that carried a strong water reward signal. On trials when the
monkey viewed informative cues, the neuron was phasically
excited by the cue indicating a large reward, and inhibited
by the cue indicating a small reward. In contrast, on trials when
the monkey was forced to view uninformative random cues,
the neuron had little response to the cues but was strongly
responsive to the later reward outcome, excited when the
reward was large and inhibited when it was small. Thus, consis-
tent with previous studies, this neuron signaled changes in the
monkey’s expectation of water rewards.
The same neuron also responded to the targets indicating the
availability of information. On forced trials when only one target
was available, the neuron was excited by the informative-cue
target and inhibited by the random-cue target. On choice trials
when both targets were available, the monkey always chose to
receive information, and the neuron responded much as it did
when the informative-cue target was presented alone. Thus,
this dopamine neuron signaled changes in both the expectation
of water and the expectation of information.
This pattern of responses was quite common in dopamine
neurons. We measured each neuron’s discrimination between
targets, cues, and rewards using the area under the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) (Figures 4B–4D, Experimental
Procedures). This measure ranges from 0.5 at chance levels to
0.0 or 1.0 for perfect discrimination. As in the example, neurons
discriminated strongly between informative reward-predicting
cues and between randomly sized rewards, but only weakly
between uninformative random cues and between fully predict-
able rewards (Figures 4C and 4D). The same neurons also
discriminated between the targets, with clear preferential activa-
tion by the target that predicted advance information (Figure 4B).
The discrimination was highly similar when measured using
either forced-information or choice-information trials in indepen-
dent data sets (rho = 0.68, p < 104; Experimental Procedures),
indicating that the neural preference for information was repro-
ducible and consistent across different stimulus configurations.
The same pattern occurred in both monkeys (Figure S4) and
could be seen in the population average firing rate (Figure 4A).There was also a tendency for neurons to have a weak initial
excitation for each task event (Figures 4A and S4). This nonspe-
cific response is probably due to the animal’s initial uncertainty
about the stimulus identity (Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Day et al.,
2007) or stimulus timing (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kobayashi and
Schultz, 2008). We did not observe a predominant tendency for
neurons to have anticipatory tonic increases in activity before
the delivery of probabilistic rewards, a phenomenon that has
been reported in one study (Fiorillo et al., 2003) but not others (Sa-
toh et al., 2003;Morris etal., 2006;Bayerand Glimcher,2005;Mat-
sumoto and Hikosaka, 2007; Joshua et al., 2008). This may be due
to differences in task design such as the size of the reward or the
manner in which the reward was signaled (Fiorillo et al., 2003).
An important question is whether dopamine neurons signal the
presence of information per se, or whether they truly signal how
much it is preferred. In the latter case, there should be a correla-
tion between the neural preference for information, expressed as
the neural discrimination between the informative-cue target and
the random-cue target, and the behavioral preference for infor-
mation, expressed as a choice percentage. Such correlations
were indeed present, both between-monkeys and within-
monkey. Between-monkeys, monkey V expressed a stronger
behavioral preference for information than monkey Z (Figure 1B),
and also expressed a stronger neural preference (p = 0.02, Fig-
ure 5A). Within-monkey, during the sessions in which monkey
Z’s behavioral preference was strongest, the neural preference
was enhanced (rho = 0.44, p = 0.02, Figure 5D). On the other
hand, behavioral preferences for information were not signifi-
cantly correlated with neural discrimination between water-
related cues or water rewards (all p > 0.25, Figures 5B, 5C, 5E,
and 5F). Thus, consistent with evidence that dopamine neurons
signal the subjective value of liquid rewards (Morris et al., 2006;
Roesch et al., 2007; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008), they may also
signal the subjective value of information.
DISCUSSION
Here we have shown that macaque monkeys prefer to receive
advance information about future rewards, and that their behav-
ioral preference is paralleled by the neural preference of midbrain
dopamine neurons. Thus, the same dopamine neurons thatNeuron 63, 119–126, July 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 121
Neuron
Dopamine Neurons Signal Informationsignal primitive rewards like food and water also signal the cogni-
tive reward of advance information.
Monkeys expressed a strong preference for advance informa-
tion even though it had no effect on the final reward outcome.
This is consistent with the intuitive belief that, all things being equal,
it is better to seek knowledge than to seek ignorance. It also
provides an explanation for the puzzling fact that the brain devotes
a great deal of neural effort to processing reward information even
when this is not required to perform the task at hand. For example,
many studies use passive classical conditioning tasks in which
informative cues are followed by rewards with no requirement for
the subject to take any action. In these tasks the brain could simply
ignore the cues and wait passively for rewards to arrive. Yet even
after extensive training, many neurons continue to use the cue
information to predict the size, probability, and timing of reward
delivery (e.g., Tobleretal., 2003; Joshuaetal., 2008). Inother tasks,
neurons persist in predicting rewards even when the act of predic-
tion is harmful, causing maladaptive behavior that interferes with
reward consumption (e.g., refusing to perform trials with low pre-
dicted value; Shidara and Richmond, 2002; Lauwereyns et al.,
2002). These observations suggest that the act of prediction has
a special status, an intrinsic motivational or rewarding value of its
own. Our data provide strong evidence for this hypothesis. When
given an explicit choice, monkeys actively sought out the advance
information that was necessary to make accurate reward predic-
tions at the earliest possible opportunity.
A limitation of our study is that it does not determine the precise
psychological mechanism by which value is assigned to informa-
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Figure 4. Analysis of the Dopamine Neuron Population
(A) Population average firing rate. Conventions as in Figure 3.
Gray bars indicate the time windows used for the ROC anal-
ysis. Colored bars indicate time points with a significant differ-
ence between selected pairs of task conditions (p < 0.01, Wil-
coxon signed rank test), as follows. Target: force-info versus
force-rand (red), choice-info versus force-rand (pink); Cue:
info-big versus info-small (red), rand-cross versus rand-wave
(blue); Reward: info-big versus info-small (red), rand-big versus
rand-small (blue).
(B–D) Neural discrimination between task conditions in
response to the targets (B), cues (C), and rewards (D). Each
dot’s (x, y) coordinates represent a single neuron’s ROC area
for discriminating between the pairs of task conditions listed
on the x and y axes. A discrimination of 1 indicates perfect pref-
erence for the condition listed next to ‘‘1’’ (e.g., ‘‘Choice info’’);
discrimination of 0 indicates perfect preference for the condi-
tion listed next to ‘‘0’’ (e.g., ‘‘Force rand’’). Note that in (B) the
x and y coordinates were both calculated using the same set
of forced-random trials. Colored dots indicate neurons with
significant discrimination between the conditions listed on
the y axis (red), x axis (blue), or both axes (magenta) (p <
0.05, Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
tion. There are several possibilities. Theories from
experimental psychology suggest that in our task
the value of viewing informative cues would simply
be the sum of the conditioned reinforcement gener-
ated by the individual big-reward and small-reward
cues. In this view, the preference for information
implies that the conditioned reinforcement is
weighted nonlinearly, so that the benefit of strong reinforcement
from the big-reward cue outweighs the drawback of weak rein-
forcement from the small-reward cue (Wyckoff, 1959; Fantino,
1977; Dinsmoor, 1983), akin to the nonlinear weighting of rewards
that produces risk seeking (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944). On the other hand, theories in economics suggest that pref-
erence is not due to independent contributions of individual cues
but instead comes from considering the full probability distribution
of future events. In this view, information-seeking is due to an
explicit preference for early resolution of uncertainty (Kreps and
Porteus, 1978) or an implicit preference induced by psychological
factors such as anticipatory emotions (Caplin and Leahy, 2001). In
addition, just as the value assigned to conventional forms of
reward (e.g., food) depends on the internal state of the subject
(e.g., hunger), the value assigned to information is likely to depend
on psychological factors such as personality (Miller, 1987),
emotions like hope and anxiety (Chew and Ho, 1994; Wu, 1999),
and attitudes toward uncertainty (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2000;
Platt and Huettel, 2008).
Implications of Information-Seeking for Attitudes
toward Uncertainty
In the framework of decision-making under uncertainty, advance
information reduces the amount of reward uncertainty by narrow-
ing down the set of potential reward outcomes. Our data there-
fore suggest that in our task, rhesus macaque monkeys preferred
to reduce their reward uncertainty at the earliest possible
moment, as though the experience of uncertainty was aversive.122 Neuron 63, 119–126, July 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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decision tasks came to a seemingly opposite conclusion:
macaque monkeys appeared to prefer uncertainty, choosing
an uncertain, variable-size reward instead of a certain, fixed-
size reward (McCoy and Platt, 2005; Platt and Huettel, 2008).
How can these results be reconciled? One possibility is that
they can be explained by a common principle; for instance,
perhaps monkeys treat the offer of a variable-size reward as
a source of uncertainty to be confronted and resolved. An impor-
tant point, however, is that a preference for reward variance can
be caused by factors unrelated to uncertainty—most notably, it
can be caused by an explicit preference over the probability
distribution of reward outcomes, for instance due to dispropor-
tionate salience of large rewards (Hayden and Platt, 2007) or
a nonlinear utility function (Platt and Huettel, 2008). In contrast,
the choice of information has no influence on the reward
outcome; it only affects the amount of time spent in a state of
uncertainty before the reward outcome is revealed. In this sense
the preference for advance information is a relatively pure
measurement of attitudes toward uncertainty.
Information Signals in the Dopaminergic Reward
System
Dopamine neuron activity is thought to teach the brain to seek
basic goals like food and water, reinforcing and punishing
actions by adjusting synaptic connections between neurons in
cortical and subcortical brain structures (Wise, 2004; Montague
et al., 2004). Our data suggest that the same neural system also
teaches the brain to seek advance information, selectively rein-
forcing actions that lead to knowledge about rewards in the
future. Thus, the behavioral preference for information could be
created by the dopaminergic reward system. At the neural level,
neurons that gain sensitivity to rewards through a dopamine-
mediated reinforcement process would come to represent
both rewards and advance information about those rewards in
a ‘‘common currency,’’ particularly neurons involved in reward
timing, conditioned reinforcement, and decision-making under
risk (Kim et al., 2008; Seo and Lee, 2009; Platt and Huettel,
2008). In turn, these signals could ultimately feed back to dopa-
mine neurons to influence their value signals.
An important goal for future research will therefore be to
discover how dopamine neurons measure information and
assign its rewarding value. One possibility is that dopamine
neurons receive information-related input from specialized brain
areas, distinct from those that compute the value of traditional
rewards like food and water. Indeed, signals encoding the
amount and timing of reward information, and dissociated from
preference coding of traditional rewards, have been found in
several cortical areas (Nakamura, 2006; Behrens et al., 2007;
Luhmann et al., 2008). How these information signals could be
translated into a behavioral preference, and whether they are
communicated to dopamine neurons, is unknown.
Another possibility is that dopamine neurons receive informa-
tion signals from the same brain areas that contribute to their
food- and water-related signals, such as the lateral habenula
(Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007). In this case, dopamine
neurons would receive a highly processed input, with different
forms of rewards already converted into a common currency
by upstream brain areas. We are currently testing this possibility
in further experiments.
Why Do Dopamine Neurons Treat Information
as a Reward?
The preference for advance information, despite its intuitive
appeal, is not predicted by current computational models of
dopamine neuron function (Schultz et al., 1997; Montague
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Figure 5. Correlation between Neural Discrimi-
nation and Behavioral Preference
(A) Histogram of single-neuron target response
discrimination between all informative trials (choice
and forced trials combined) versus forced-random
trials, separately for monkey V (left) and monkey Z
(right). Arrows, numbers, and horizontal lines indicate
the mean discrimination, and the width of the arrows
represents the 95% bootstrap confidence interval.
Red indicates statistical significance of the difference
between the monkeys.
(B and C) Same as (A), for discrimination between in-
formative big-reward and small-reward cues (B) or
between random big and small rewards (C).
(D) Plot of behavioral choice percentage against
single-neuron discrimination between all informative
trials versus forced-random trials in response to the
target. The line was fitted by least-squares regression.
Text shows Spearman’s rank correlation (rho), and red
indicates statistical significance. The data are from
monkey Z only, because monkey V almost exclusively
chose the informative target and therefore had no
behavioral variability.
(E and F) Same as (D), but for discrimination between
informative big-reward and small-reward cues (E) or
between random big and small rewards (F).Neuron 63, 119–126, July 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 123
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rithms for reinforcement learning. This raises an important ques-
tion: could the information-predictive activity of dopamine
neurons be a harmful ‘‘bug’’ that impairs the efficiency of reward
learning? Or is it a useful ‘‘feature’’ that improves over existing
computational models? Here we present our hypothesis that
the positive value of advance information is a feature with
a fundamental role in reinforcement learning.
Specifically, modern theories of reinforcement learning rec-
ognize that animals learn from two types of reinforcement:
‘‘primary’’ reinforcement generated by rewards themselves,
and ‘‘secondary’’ reinforcement generated predictively, by ob-
serving sensory cues in advance of reward delivery. Predictive
reinforcement greatly enhances the speed and reliability of
learning, as demonstrated most strikingly by temporal-difference
learning algorithms (Sutton and Barto, 1998), which have
produced influential accounts of animal behavior (Sutton and
Barto, 1981) and dopamine neuron activity (Schultz et al., 1997;
Montague et al., 2004). This implies that animals should treat
predictive reinforcement as an object of desire, making an active
effort to seek out environments where reward-predictive sensory
cues are plentiful. If an animal was trapped in an impoverished
environment where reward-predictive cues were unavailable,
the consequences would be devastating: the animal’s sophisti-
cated predictive reinforcement learning algorithms would be
reduced to impotence. This can be seen clearly in our dopamine
neuron data (Figure 4A). When an action produces informative
cues, dopamine neuronssignal its value immediately, a predictive
reinforcement signal; but when an action produces uninformative
cues, dopamine neurons must wait to signal its value until the
reward outcome arrives, acting as little more than a primitive
reward detector. Thus, predictive reinforcement depends entirely
on obtaining advance information about upcoming rewards.
In light of these considerations, we propose that any learning
system driven by the ‘‘engine’’ of predictive reinforcement
must actively seek out its ‘‘fuel’’ of advance information. In this
view, current models of neural reinforcement learning present
a curious paradox: their learning algorithms are vitally dependent
on advance information, but they treat information as valueless
and make no effort to obtain it. These models do include
a form of knowledge-seeking by exploring unfamiliar actions,
but they make no effort to obtain informative cues that would
maximize learning from these new experiences. In fact, models
using the popular TD(l) algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1998) are
actually averse to advance information (Figure S5). Our data
show that a new class of models is necessary that assign infor-
mation a positive value—perhaps representing the future reward
the animal expects to receive, as a result of obtaining better fuel
for its learning algorithm. This would be akin to the concept of
intrinsically motivated reinforcement learning (Barto et al.,
2004), in that dopamine neurons would assign an intrinsic value
to information because it could help the animal learn to better
predict and control its environment (Barto et al., 2004; Redgrave
and Gurney, 2006). Also, although dopamine neurons have been
best studied in the realm of rewards, they can also respond to
salient nonrewarding stimuli (Horvitz, 2000; Redgrave and
Gurney, 2006; Joshua et al., 2008; Matsumoto and Hikosaka,
2009). This suggests that dopamine neurons might be able to124 Neuron 63, 119–126, July 16, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.signal the value of information about neutral and punishing
events (Herry et al., 2007; Badia et al., 1979; Fanselow, 1979;
Tsuda et al., 1989), as part of a more general role in motivating
animals to learn about the world around them.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Subjects were two male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta), monkey
V (9.3 kg) and monkey Z (8.7 kg). All procedures for animal care and experimen-
tation were approved by the Institute Animal Care and Use Committee and
complied with the Public Health Service Policy on the humane care and use
of laboratory animals. A plastic head holder, scleral search coils, and plastic
recording chambers were implanted under general anesthesia and sterile
surgical conditions.
Behavioral Tasks
Behavioral tasks were under the control of the REX program (Hays et al., 1982)
adapted for the QNX operating system. Monkeys sat in a primate chair, facing
a frontoparallel screen 31 cm from the monkey’s eyes in a sound-attenuated
and electrically shielded room. Eye movements were monitored using a scleral
search coil system with 1 ms resolution. Stimuli generated by an active matrix
liquid crystal display projector (PJ550, ViewSonic) were rear-projected on the
screen.
In the information choice task (Figure 1), each trial began with the appear-
ance of a central spot of light (1 diameter), which the monkey was required
to fixate. After 800 ms, the spot disappeared and two colored targets ap-
peared on the left and right sides of the screen (2.5 diameter, 10–15 eccen-
tricity). (On forced-information and forced-random trials, only a single target
appeared). The monkey had 710 ms to saccade to and fixate the chosen
target, after which the nonchosen target immediately disappeared. At the
end of the 710 ms response window, a cue (14 diameter) was presented of
the chosen color. For the informative color, the cue was a cross on large-
reward trials or a wave pattern on small-reward trials. For the random color,
the cue’s shape was chosen pseudorandomly on each trial (see below). The
colors were green and orange, chosen to have similar luminance, and counter-
balanced across monkeys. Monkeys were not required to fixate the cue. After
2250 ms of display time, the cue disappeared and simultaneously a 200 ms
tone sounded and reward delivery began. The intertrial interval was 3850–
4850 ms beginning from the disappearance of the cue. Water rewards were
delivered using a gravity-based system (Crist Instruments). Reward delivery
lasted 50 ms on small-reward trials (0.04 ml) and 700 ms (0.88 ml, monkey
V) or 825 ms (1.05 ml, monkey Z) on large-reward trials. To minimize the effects
of physical preparation, licking the water spout was not required to obtain
rewards; water was delivered directly into the mouth.
The task proceeded in blocks of 24 trials, each block containing a random-
ized sequence of all 3x2x2x2 combinations of choice type (forced-information,
forced-random, or choice), reward size (large or small), random cue shape
(cross or waves), and informative target location (left or right). Thus, the
‘‘random’’ cues were actually quasirandom and could theoretically yield a small
amount of information about reward size, but extracting that information would
require a very difficult feat of working memory.
If monkeys made an error (broke fixation on the central spot, failed to choose
a target, or broke fixation on the chosen target before the cue appeared), then
the trial terminated, an error tone sounded, an additional 3 s were added to the
intertrial interval, and the trial was repeated (‘‘correction trial’’). If the error
occurred after the choice, only the chosen target was available on the correc-
tion trial.
The information delay task (Figure 2) was identical to the information choice
task except the cue colors and shapes were different, and a third set of always-
informative gray cues lasting for 1500 ms were appended to the cue period.
(There were also minor differences in the task parameters for monkey Z: the
duration of the first cue was 2000 ms, and the big reward volume was
1.29 ml). The 1500 ms duration of the always-informative cue was chosen
to allow near-optimal physical preparation for rewards. With a shorter cue
duration (e.g., <750 ms), there might not be enough time to discriminate the
Neuron
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licking in Tobler et al., 2003). With a longer cue duration (e.g., >2 s), physical
preparation for reward delivery begins to be impaired by timing errors (e.g.,
compare to the time course of anticipatory licking in Fiorillo et al., 2008;
Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008). To perform a reversal (vertical lines in Fig-
ure 2B), the colors of the informative and random cues were switched.
Neural Recording
Midbrain dopamine neurons were recorded using techniques described previ-
ously (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007). A recording chamber was placed over
fronto-parietal cortex, tilted laterally by 35, and aimed at the substantia nigra.
The recording sites were determined using a grid system, which allowed
recordings at 1 mm spacing. Single-neuron recording was performed using
tungsten electrodes (Frederick Haer) that were inserted through a stainless
steel guide tube and advanced by an oil-driven micro-manipulator (MO-97A,
Narishige). Single neurons were isolated on-line using custom voltage-time
window discrimination software (the MEX program (Hays et al., 1982) adapted
for the QNX operating system).
Neurons were recorded in and around the substantia nigra pars compacta
and ventral tegmental area. We targeted this region based on anatomical at-
lases and magnetic resonance imaging (4.7T, Bruker). During recording
sessions, we identified this region based on recording depth and using land-
marks including the somatosensory and motor thalamus, subthalamic
nucleus, substantia nigra pars reticulata, red nucleus, and oculomotor nerve.
Presumed dopamine neurons were identified by their irregular tonic firing at
0.5–10 Hz and broad spike waveforms. We focused our recordings on
presumed dopamine neurons that responded to the task and appeared to
carry positive reward signals. Occasional dopamine-like neurons that upon
examination showed no differential response to the cues and no differential
response to the reward outcomes were not recorded further. We then analyzed
all neurons that were recorded for at least 60 trials and that had positive reward
discrimination for both informative cues and random outcomes, positive
reward discrimination for cues and no discrimination for outcomes, or positive
reward discrimination for outcomes and no discrimination for cues (p < 0.05,
Wilcoxon rank-sum test). We were able to examine the response properties
of 108 neurons, 84 of which met our criteria for presumed dopaminergic firing
rate, pattern, and spike waveform, and 47 of which also met our criteria for trial
count and significant reward signals. This yielded 20 neurons from monkey V
(right hemisphere) and 27 neurons from monkey Z (left hemisphere) for our
analysis.
Data Analysis
All statistical tests were two-tailed. The neural analysis excluded error trials
and correction trials. We analyzed neural activity in time windows 150–
500 ms after target onset (targets), 150–300 ms after cue onset (cues), and
200–450 ms after cue offset (rewards). These were chosen to include the major
components of the average neural response. The neural discrimination
between a pair of task conditions was defined as the area under the ROC,
which can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen single-trial
firing rate from the first condition was greater than a randomly chosen single-
trial firing rate from the second condition (Green and Swets, 1966). We
observed the same results using other measures of neural discrimination
such as the signal-to-baseline ratio and signal-to-noise ratio. Confidence inter-
vals and significance of the population averages of single-neuron ROC areas
(Figures 5A–5C) were computed using a bootstrap test with 200,000 resam-
ples (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Consistent with previous studies of reward
coding (Schultz and Romo, 1990; Kawagoe et al., 2004; Roesch et al., 2007;
Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2007), we observed similar neural coding of behav-
ioral preferences for both of the target locations on the screen (average ROC
area, forced-information versus forced-random: ipsilateral = 0.60, p < 104,
contralateral = 0.62, p < 104; choice-information versus forced-random: ipsi-
lateral 0.58, p < 104, contralateral 0.62, p < 104), so for all analyses the data
were combined. We could not analyze activity on choice-random trials due to
their rarity (<3 trials for most neurons). All correlations were computed using
Spearman’s rho (rank correlation). To compare neural discrimination
measured using either forced-information or choice-information trials in inde-
pendent data sets, we calculated the correlation between two values, thediscrimination between forced-information trials versus even-numbered
forced-random trials, and the discrimination between choice-information trials
versus odd-numbered forced-random trials (rho = 0.68, p < 104). Significance
of correlations, and of the difference in mean ROC area between the two
monkeys (Figure 5), was computed using permutation tests (200,000 permuta-
tions) (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993).
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Supplemental data for this article include two Supplemental Notes and five
figures with accompanying text, and can be found at http://www.cell.com/
neuron/supplemental/S0896-6273(09)00462-0.
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